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Abstract 
 
This article explores the factors that hinder and promote the deployment of renewable energy 
generating infrastructure in/across the Swiss cantons (i.e. the country’s federal units). Using the 
example of small-scale hydropower, we shed light on how political regulations at the cantonal 
level interact with national policies and the local political process to affect the deployment of 
renewable energy production. The analysis demonstrates that political regulations can both 
foster and hinder the deployment of renewable energy production. While the national feed-in 
tariff scheme is revealed to be a beneficial framework condition, cantonal regulations hamper, 
rather than facilitate, the deployment of small-scale hydropower. Moreover, inclusive local 
processes and the existence of local entrepreneurs seem to act as a trigger for the local 
acceptance of renewable energy generation infrastructure. More generally, we conclude that, 
quite independently of whether state structures are decentralized or centralized, subnational and 
local leeway in the definition and organization of projects can help to prevent or deal with local 
opposition.  
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Introduction 
Renewable energy production is on the rise in many countries. This trend is a reflection of the 
fact that by 2016, almost all states had formulated political goals to increase their share of 
renewable energies (REN21 2017). Many countries have adopted explicit policies aimed at 
promoting renewable energy production, such as feed-in-tariffs, tendering or fiscal incentives 
(REN21 2017) targeted at both “old” (e.g., hydropower) and “new” (wind and solar power) 
renewable energy technologies (RET). Yet, the implementation of these political goals and 
policies which requires the construction of renewable energy generation infrastructure, tends to 
trigger opposition (Devine-Wright 2011; Soini et al. 2011; Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer 
2007). This can result in the delay or even termination of local projects. 
The present contribution focuses on the difficulties related to the implementation of RET 
infrastructure in a federal context and asks: What factors promote and obstruct RET 
implementation at the local level? Using the deployment of small-scale hydropower in the 
Swiss cantons as an example, we depart from the assumption that the prevalence of renewable 
energy production is not the exclusive result of natural, technical and economic aspects. Instead, 
we argue that renewable energy development is decisively influenced by political factors. We 
are particularly interested in how the cantonal policy mix shapes RET implementation. The 
study seeks to shed light on how the cantonal policy context interacts with political regulations 
at the national level and local political processes to affect the deployment of renewable energy 
production. The role of three different political levels (national, cantonal, and local) is highly 
relevant for RET implementation, which eventually takes place at the local level but is also 
heavily influenced by political regulations at higher administrative levels (see Lachapelle, 
Borick, and Rabe 2012) – particularly in federal countries like Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Switzerland and the United States. These aspects of multi-level governance and the 
importance of local processes and stakeholders have been overlooked in previous research on 
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renewable energy policies and implementation (Valentine 2010, 1918). Focusing on 
Switzerland, where the national level has set comparatively ambitious goals concerning the 
promotion of renewable energy production (see Balthasar, Schreurs & Varone, this issue), our 
study aims to identify the factors that are conducive to the successful local implementation of 
national targets in a context of ample subnational autonomy.   
Switzerland is a particularly apt choice for a systematic comparison. Whereas most previous 
studies in the field have focused on either a single or small number of political entities (see Tabi 
and Wüstenhagen 2017 for a literature review), we use a (subnational) comparative perspective 
to identify factors that generally tend to facilitate or hinder the deployment of renewable energy 
production.   
Empirically, we focus on small-scale hydropower (facilities with a mean mechanical gross 
capacity of 0.3 MW up to 10 MW), for which reliable cantonal deployment data are available. 
The Swiss Energy Strategy 2050 identifies small-scale hydropower as one renewable energy 
source that should be promoted in order to replace the current energy production from nuclear 
plants. A recent report assessing the potential of small-scale hydropower in Switzerland 
concludes that with 0.7-2.0 TWh the potential for new small-scale hydropower plants is 
“relatively small, but non-negligible” (Bauer et al. 2017, 30). While compared to other RET 
like wind or solar power, small-scale hydropower may be most strongly restricted by natural 
factors such as the existence of waterways and topography, the implementation of small-scale 
hydropower projects is characterized by environmental, economic, and societal conflicts similar 
to those relevant to the implementation of RET in general (Tabi and Wüstenhagen 2017, 763). 
Generating new insights into the factors that influence the deployment of small-scale 
hydropower can therefore inform RET implementation more broadly.  
We apply a mixed-methods approach, and combine a statistical comparison of the Swiss 
cantons based on a Bayesian estimation approach with qualitative comparative case studies. 
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Whereas the quantitative approach enables us to analyze generalizable patterns associated with 
the deployment of small-scale hydropower, namely the role of varying cantonal policy contexts, 
the qualitative analysis provides a more in-depth understanding of the mechanisms behind these 
generalizable factors, as well as of the interactions among local, cantonal, and national factors.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we provide a short overview of the 
different degrees of deployment of small-scale hydropower in the Swiss cantons. In the next 
section, a theoretical background and hypotheses, which could explain this variation, are 
presented. This is followed by a discussion of our data, methods and empirical results. The 
Swiss findings are also presented in a comparative perspective. We conclude with a summary 
of our most important findings and a discussion of their implications. 
 
Small-scale Hydropower in the Swiss Cantons 
Hydropower is Switzerland’s most important source of renewable energy. In 2018, it accounted 
for 57 percent of total electricity production (Bundesamt für Energie BFE 2018). Electricity 
production from small-scale hydropower has a long tradition. The number of small-scale 
hydropower plants has increased from 300 with an installed capacity of around 700 MW in 
1990 to 470 and an installed capacity of 940 MW in 2017 (Bundesamt für Energie BFE 2017). 
To reach the production goals defined in the national Energy Strategy 2050, the country needs 
to both update and expand existing power plants and build new ones.  
The deployment of hydropower requires different policy measures. Switzerland’s federal 
structures strongly shape energy policy. While the federal level defines the general energy 
strategy based on framework legislation and programs, the cantons are responsible for its 
implementation (Rieder, Balthasar, and Kissling-Näf 2014; Sager 2014). As a result, cantons 
enjoy considerable leeway in policy design. They can decide how strongly and through what 
instruments renewable energy policies will be promoted, which, in turn, results in a large 
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cantonal heterogeneity not only in terms of the adopted energy policies but also with regards to 
the deployment of renewable energy infrastructure (Stadelmann-Steffen et al. 2018). 
Figure 1 shows that small-scale hydropower plants exist in all Swiss cantons except Basel City. 
Yet, the number of power plants and the installed capacity differ greatly across cantons. For 
example, the cantons of Grisons, Valais, and Berne exhibit the highest number of power plants 
and the highest amount of installed capacity. In contrast, other large cantons like Zurich or 
Solothurn are marked by a significantly lower deployment of small-scale hydropower facilities.  
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
The bottom graph in Figure 1 depicts the usage rate in each canton, i.e., the installed capacity 
in relation to the federal unit’s theoretical hydro-electrical potential (Schröder, Hemund, and 
Weingartner 2012). One can observe that the cantons differ in terms of the degree to which they 
exploit their natural potential. For example, installed capacity only corresponds to 6% of 
Grison’s theoretical potential in small-scale hydropower, whereas in Berne this share is twice 
as high. The remainder of this paper seeks to explain these differences both theoretically and 
empirically.  
 
Theoretical Background: Promoters of and Barriers to the Deployment of 
Renewable Energy Sources in a Federal Context 
The previous literature on RET implementation suggests that successful implementation relies 
on a wide range of different factors. While natural and economic factors, such as the availability 
of technical solutions and the presence of natural and economic preconditions, obviously play 
an important role, the “social side” (Batel, Devine-Wright, and Tangeland 2013) of RET 
implementation can not be ignored. A lack of social acceptance is “one factor that can 
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potentially be a powerful barrier to the achievement of renewable energy targets” 
(Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer 2007, 2683). We distinguish between two groups of 
explanatory factors to account for cantonal diversity in the deployment of small-scale 
hydropower: natural and economic factors, and (socio-)political factors. This distinction also 
reflects the main arguments in the existing hydropower debate, according to which hydropower 
plants should be assessed based on their specific costs and benefits? (Koch 2002). 
Each canton’s natural potential for small-scale hydropower is the most obvious of all natural 
and economic factors. The mountainous cantons Berne, Grisons, Ticino, Uri and Valais exhibit 
the highest theoretical potentials (Schröder, Hemund, and Weingartner 2012, 45). Political units 
with a high potential for small-scale hydropower may be expected to have a higher number of 
plants and a higher installed capacity. Yet, while natural potential captures what is technically 
feasible, it does not reflect the efficacy and efficiency aspects that installation rates are also 
dependent upon (e.g., a larger potential may make a plant more economically attractive, see 
also Koch (2002)).  
On the technical side, local and regional companies that possess the know-how to plan and 
construct small-scale hydropower plants can be an important driver of their regional 
deployment. Previous experiences with RET increases the likelihood that their use will be 
expanded and reduces the likelihood of local opposition (e.g., Ek 2005; Firestone et al. 2012; 
Warren and Gastil 2015; Wolsink 2007). Accordingly, experience in the planning and 
construction of small-scale hydropower plants will arguably be related to lower construction 
costs driven by learning effects as well as R&D (Kammermann 2018; Papineau 2006). Such 
conditions will be conducive to the deployment of small-scale hydropower. Finally, in the 
context of increasing electricity production from renewable sources, the question of how the 
generated electricity is integrated into the grid is crucial (e.g., Devine-Wright 2005; Osmani et 
al. 2013). This consideration may be particularly relevant in the case of small-scale hydropower 
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plants, which are often found in rather remote or at least decentralized areas. Hence, if 
distribution grid operators offer easy access for decentrally produced electricity, small-scale 
hydropower plants are more likely to be built. The distribution grid operators in Switzerland 
are monopolies in their areas, and are obliged to purchase the produced electricity, provide the 
technical prerequisites to integrate the electricity into the grid (e.g., lines, transformers), and 
administratively and financially render accounts for the feed-in (e.g., register the amount of 
electricity and payments). However, whereas in some cantons, one distribution grid operator 
covers the entire cantonal area and, thus, all potential sites for a new plant, in other cantons the 
area and, for example, relevant river basins, are distributed among various operators. Not all 
distribution grid operators may be equally interested in connecting new power plants to the 
grid. Some operators will support the construction of a new plant or even initiate one 
themselves. Others may not find connecting a new power plant to the grid profitable, as such 
an operation may require that the grid be improved. In similar situations, one strategy to avoid 
costs is to provide unfavorable conditions so that project initiators eventually refrain from 
constructing a new power plant. This can be accomplished, for example, by raising connection 
costs1 or prolonging implementation processes. Hence, a higher number of distribution grid 
operators increases the likelihood that at least one distribution grid operator supports new 
projects or even initiates them.   
Based on these considerations, we formulate three hypotheses about the role of natural and 
economic factors in the cantonal deployment of small-scale hydropower: 
H1: The higher the natural potential of a canton is, the higher the deployment of small-scale 
hydropower will be. 
H2: The more extensive the local know-how in terms of companies with experience and 
technical knowledge is, the higher the deployment of small-scale hydropower in the canton will 
be. 
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H3: Good feed-in conditions in a canton are associated with a greater generation of small-
scale hydropower. 
As (socio-)political factors may also play an important role in RET implementation and the 
deployment of small-scale hydropower, we examine political factors at the subnational (here: 
cantonal) level. Although federal countries like Switzerland choose their framework legislation 
at the national level (which, thus, defines the general framework for all subnational units), 
federal units enjoy considerable leeway in how they steer cantonal energy production toward 
the nationally set targets. The particular policy mix that a canton adopts to promote hydropower 
may therefore help explain its deployment of small-scale hydropower. We expect a more 
encompassing policy mix, including both “soft instruments” like information and voluntary 
measures and financial or even regulatory instruments aimed at promoting hydropower plants, 
to be associated with more significant deployment of small-scale hydropower.  
Moreover, implementation research has argued that cantonal administrative resources heavily 
affect the implementation of public polices (Rieder, Balthasar, and Kissling-Näf 2014; Sabatier 
and Mazmanian 1980). Rieder et al. (2014) have shown that, it the Swiss case, a lack of financial 
or personal resources in the administration and, particularly, in the responsible office is 
associated with implementation deficits as well as structural deficits in the implementation 
process. More specifically, these earlier findings lead us to expect that when the cantonal energy 
office has access to better and more copious administrative resources, the implementation of 
nationally formulated targets may be better and the deployment of small-scale hydropower may 
be higher.  
Finally, previous research has emphasized that the lack of social acceptance of small-scale 
hydropower may act as a barrier to successful RET implementation (Dermont et al. 2017; 
Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer 2007). In this vein, Dermont et al. (2017) argue that the 
different stages of the policy-making process need different types of social acceptance. High 
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acceptance at the most general, socio-political level, will not automatically translate into local 
acceptance of concrete projects. Nevertheless, a high level of socio-political acceptance of 
small-scale hydropower can be expected to be conducive to a higher deployment of this 
renewable energy source because more concrete opposition towards specific local projects is 
less likely to develop during the implementation process. 
Thus, political dynamics at the cantonal level lead us to expect that: 
H4: More encompassing cantonal policies promoting hydropower are associated with a higher 
deployment of small-scale hydropower in the respective canton. 
H5: Higher administrative resources at the cantonal level are associated with a higher 
deployment of small-scale hydropower. 
H6: A high level of social acceptance of small-scale hydropower is conducive to a higher 
cantonal deployment of this energy source. 
 
Research Design 
Method 
Methodologically, we combine a statistical comparison of the Swiss cantons with in-depth case 
studies of two cantons. The statistical analysis focuses on the cantonal level and helps identify 
the main factors associated with the deployment of small-scale hydropower in a generalizable 
way. In contrast, the case studies shed light on concrete local projects within two cantons and 
enable us to show how the statistical relationships and the underlying causal mechanisms work. 
They also clarify under what conditions national regulations like the feed-in tariff system are a 
prerequisite for successful (cantonal) projects and how much local aspects, such as the inclusion 
of local stakeholders, influence the planning and implementation process. 
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We estimate cross-sectional Bayesian regression models in the first part of our analysis. The 
Bayesian approach is particularly suitable when the number of cases is low and when the data 
used cannot be considered a sample of some larger population (Jackman 2009). We analyze the 
full population by taking all 26 Swiss cantons (Jackman 2009) (although we exclude some of 
them in our main models, see below). The Bayesian approach provides a coherent basis for 
inference in our analysis of the distribution of small hydropower across the Swiss cantons.  
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the Bayesian estimation results, we provide the mean 
and the 95% credible intervals of the posterior distribution, which can be interpreted like their 
counterparts produced by standard regressions. The mean is the average effect of an 
independent variable on the dependent variable and the credible interval gives a sense of the 
statistical reliability of the estimate. A full Bayesian analysis requires the specification of priors 
for the unknown parameters. We used non-informative priors for the coefficient parameters in 
order to affect the resulting posterior distribution as little as possible (Stegmueller 2013). We 
used the R package MCMCglmm (Hadfield 2010) to estimate the models. We let the models 
run for 800,000 iterations, with a burn-in of 600,000 and a thinning of 1. Extensive diagnostics 
based on the graphical inspection of the trajectories and the autocorrelations as well as on 
Geweke and Heidelberg diagnostics indicate that the chains have mixed well and converged.  
In the second part of our analysis, we explore two specific cases in order to gain a better 
understanding of the causal relationship between the independent and the dependent variables. 
The case study focuses on two similar projects in two different cantons: a project on the 
Walibach in the Grafschaft municipality in Valais, and a project on the Milibach in the 
Grindelwald municipality in Berne. The selection of the cases is based on the most similar 
systems design, using Mill’s method of difference (Mill 1843; Teune and Przeworski 1970). 
Valais and Berne have similar natural potential for small-scale hydropower (Schröder, Hemund, 
and Weingartner 2012) and a high number of existing small-scale hydropower plants. 
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Moreover, both cantons promote hydropower intensively (Kammermann 2018). Local 
environmental associations opposed both projects early on voicing concerns about nature and 
landscape protection. While the project in Valais was eventually successfully implemented, the 
Bernese project failed. We conducted expert interviews with both proponents of and opponents 
to the two projects (see Table 1) in an effort to identify the effect of both national factors, such 
as feed-in tariffs, and local factors, like the inclusion of local stakeholders, in explaining these 
different outcomes.  
-- Table 1 about here -- 
 
Variables and measurement used in the Bayesian analysis 
We rely on two indicators to measure the deployment of small-scale hydropower in the Swiss 
cantons. First, we measure how many small-scale hydropower plants existed in a canton (during 
the reference year of 2017). Then we capture the total installed capacity in the same year (in 
MW). The Federal Office of Energy (Bundesamt für Energie BFE 2017) provided the official 
data. Whereas the number of power plants reflects how successful a canton is in carrying out 
concrete projects, and thus also involves a procedural evaluation, our second variable is more 
outcome-oriented.  
To operationalize the natural and economic factors discussed above we rely on three indicators. 
We use data on the theoretical useable small-scale hydro-electrical potential (in MW and 
excluding the lower courses of the large rivers Rhine and Rhone) provided by the Federal Office 
of Energy to capture natural potential (Schröder, Hemund, and Weingartner 2012, 45). We rely 
on the cantonal small-scale hydropower industry—namely on the number of firms that supply 
small-scale hydropower plants— to measure the local know-how on small-scale hydropower 
plant construction. Thirdly, we capture feed-in conditions with the number of distribution grid 
operators in each canton.  
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Three indicators capture the aforementioned (socio-)political factors. First, Kammermann’s 
(2018) index of the comprehensiveness of the existing cantonal policy mix operationalizes each 
canton’s intensity of hydropower promotion.  Kammermann (2018) assigned all 26 cantons to 
four categories based on the hydropower policy adopted by each federal unit. Cantons with a 
strong hydropower strategy containing multiple coordinated instruments received the value of 
1. Cantons with multiple instruments not as encompassing as an overall strategy were assigned 
a value of 0.67. Those with soft instruments only (e.g., information) received the value of 0.33, 
and those with no instruments promoting hydro-electricity were coded as 0. Since only a few 
cantons fall into Kammermann’s middle categories we recoded this indicator into a dummy 
variable whereby cantons with only soft instruments or no instruments whatsoever promoting 
hydropower received a value of 0 and those characterized by a full hydropower strategy or at 
least by multiple different instruments were assigned the value of 1. We used the following 
measures to construct an index of administrative resources: number of full-time positions, 
personnel and material expenditures, and support contributions from the cantonal energy office 
(all indicators at the per capita level). We used the mean of the standardized values. Finally, we 
used survey data—the percentage of respondents who agree that small-scale hydropower should 
play a larger role in Switzerland’s future energy mix—to measure the socio-political 
acceptance that small-scale hydropower enjoys in each canton (Stadelmann-Steffen and 
Dermont 2016). 
We further controlled for each canton’s financial situation as well as the share of left-green 
parties in parliament in the analysis. More information on the variables, their descriptive 
statistics, and the data sources used is available in the Appendix (Table A.1). 
Our explanatory variables are lagged to the year before 2017 to measure potential causes before 
the observed actual outcomes (i.e., the deployment of small-scale hydropower 2017). However, 
strictly speaking, our cross-sectional design does not allow for causal conclusions. The small-
14 
 
scale hydropower plants in the Swiss cantons have experienced more or less continuous 
development over the last several decades. Thus, we acknowledge that the regression 
coefficients should be interpreted as associations rather than as causal effects, while the case 
studies help us shed light on the causality behind some of the statistical relationships the models 
make clear.  
 
Empirical results 
Figure 2 presents the results of the Bayesian regression analysis. In this model, we excluded 
the four cantons that have almost no small-scale hydropower potential: Appenzell Inner 
Rhodes, Appenzell Outer Rhodes, Basle-Town and Schaffhausen. Thus, the number of cases in 
the presented models is 22. Further analyses (included in the Appendix, Figure A.1) show that 
using the full sample leads to slightly larger credible intervals, whereas the main conclusions 
are the same as those described below. 
The results for both dependent variables, namely the number of power plants and the installed 
capacity, are very similar. This is not surprising given that the correlation between the two 
variables is very high (Pearson’s r = 0.96). However, the two variables measure different 
aspects of the deployment of small-scale hydropower. The closeness of the results speaks for 
the validity of our measurement. 
Not surprisingly, the natural potential of a canton is the most significant variable in the model. 
Thus, a larger natural potential for small-scale hydropower is associated with both a higher 
number of power plants and a higher total installed capacity. The number of distribution grid 
operators is positively associated with the deployment of small-scale hydropower. This finding 
is in keeping with the expectation that a higher number of distribution grid operators increases 
the likelihood that at least one of them will support or even initiate a project, and offer good 
feed-in conditions. 
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In addition to these natural and economic factors, the cantonal policy context is also 
systematically related to the deployment of small-scale hydropower in the cantons. However, 
and against our expectations, the more encompassing the cantonal policy mix is in terms of its 
promotion of hydropower, the lower (rather than higher) the cantonal deployment of small-
scale hydropower is. We will come back to this result later on in the paper.  
While the remaining variables are not systematically associated with the number of small-scale 
hydropower plants or the installed capacity, it is worth mentioning that the socio-political 
acceptance of small-scale hydropower tends to be positively correlated with both dependent 
variables. However, in both cases the credible intervals are broad and contain zero (i.e., the 
coefficient is not systematically different from zero). Based on this result, we cannot conclude 
that higher acceptance levels are related to a higher deployment of this energy source. Naturally, 
this is also because our cross-sectional design does not allow for causal conclusions and because 
we cannot dismiss reverse causality. In fact, the deployment of small-scale hydropower could 
also influence the socio-political acceptance of this energy source in a given canton. In this 
vein, it is interesting to note that the estimation does suggest that the association between socio-
political acceptance and hydropower deployment is very unlikely to be negative. Hence, we can 
basically reject the hypothesis that a sizable deployment of small-scale hydropower would 
decrease acceptance levels – a mechanism that could eventually be expected in light of the 
importance of factors such as the plants’ impact on local landscape, people’s closeness to a 
plant, or their attachment to the land on their opposition to RET infrastructures (e.g., Devine-
Wright 2009; Hall, Ashworth, and Devine-Wright 2013). 
 
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
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Our most intriguing finding is that an encompassing mix of policy instruments targeted at 
hydropower, which we expected to be conducive to a greater use of this energy source, is 
systematically and negatively associated with the presence of small-scale hydropower in a 
canton. To shed light on the mechanisms behind these findings, we present a comparative case 
study of one successful and one failed project in the cantons of Valais and Berne, respectively. 
Expert interviews identify three factors that were important for the success of the Valais project 
(Stadelmann-Steffen et al. 2018, 121). First, the economic conditions were favorable to this 
initiative. Specifically, the project was characterized by a solid profitability partly caused by 
the national feed-in tariff, which facilitated compensation payments. Moreover, because the 
municipality held a stake in the power plant, the municipality – and, thus, its citizens – could 
also financially profit from the project. Second, the Valais project proponents showed a strong 
willingness to engage in a dialogue with the local population and their opponents (NGOs), and 
actively sought a compromise. Meanwhile and relatedly, local entrepreneurs (the 
representatives of the municipality and of the electricity company) played an important role as 
promoters and mediators. As a result of these three factors, the initial opposition to the project 
was successfully addressed and faded away.   
The Bernese case also included negotiations between the opponents and the proponents of the 
hydropower project. The main focus of the opposition had to do with the actual location of the 
proposed power plant but alternative places were not acceptable to the electricity company. The 
lack of an acceptable alternative and the persistent local opposition to the initial proposal led to 
the project’s termination. The interviews with Bernese insiders consistently emphasized 
hydropower regulations. Berne has a water use strategy that stipulates the canton’s general 
goals and principles with respect to the use of hydropower and serves as its central planning 
tool. The strategy also classifies all running waters into green, yellow and red zones. The green 
zone allows the use of hydropower and the yellow zone only allows it under certain conditions, 
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while in the red zone the use of hydropower is not permitted. The interviewed actors explained 
that this positive planning had largely been responsible for the proposed location of the plant, 
which was planned to be in the green zone. Meanwhile, locations outside of the green areas, 
which might have been more advantageous from an economic or an efficacy perspective, were 
never considered because of the cantonal regulations in place. Valais also intensively promotes 
and regulates hydropower but does not apply positive planning, i.e., the definition of zones 
where hydropower use is allowed or prohibited. Moreover, regulation is much more 
decentralized in Valais than in Berne (Kammermann 2018), allowing local-level authorities 
more leeway in the planning and regulating of such processes.   
The comparison of the two projects provides important insights into why an encompassing 
promotion of hydropower, characterized by both a mix of promotional instruments and the 
existence of a hydropower strategy, is negatively, rather than positively, associated with the 
deployment of small-scale hydropower. It is important to note that the policy indicator we used 
in the quantitative analyses focuses on instruments intended to promote hydropower. Besides 
subsidies and information, one such instrument is regulation aimed at reducing conflicts 
between renewable energy infrastructure and spatial planning. However, the case studies 
suggest that intense cantonal promotion and regulation can take different shapes and, 
accordingly, have different intended and unintended consequences. More precisely, cantonal 
policies can be dominated by a “promotion logic,” like the Valais case illustrates. Regulation 
entails negative planning: the exploitation of some zones may be expressly forbidden, but 
specific zones for the use of hydropower are not explicitly delineated. In addition, when new 
plants are planned, areas with existing plants are preferred locations for the new projects as 
well. Regulation is decentralized and, thus, provides substantial autonomy to promoters of 
small-scale hydropower projects in terms of the design and organization of local projects. Such 
a policy context seems to be advantageous for the deployment of small-scale hydropower, 
especially when socio-political acceptance is high and economic conditions are good. 
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Conversely, cantonal policies can also follow a “protection logic.” Examples for this kind of 
regulation are the specification of something like “green” and “red” zones as in the case of 
Berne and, relatedly, a higher degree of centralization. This alternative type of intense 
regulation may also target the promotion of hydropower, but in reality and due to a reduction 
in flexibility at the local/project level, tends to obstruct successful implementation.2  
 
Discussion: The Swiss Case in International Comparison 
The analysis presented in this article is one of the first to systematically analyze RET 
implementation within federations, as Lachapelle et al. (2012) suggested be done. In this 
section, we proceed to put our findings in an international comparative perspective, i.e., “across 
federal systems” (Lachapelle, Borick, and Rabe 2012, 354). One challenge to this effort is the 
fact that federal states do not form a homogeneous group. Not only do they vary with respect 
to the specific power allocation in place between state levels (especially in the energy sector), 
but they also differ in terms of the surrounding political context, their energy-related goals, and 
their promoters. Although these specificities make generalization a difficult if not impossible 
task, we argue that our results point to at least two notable findings, especially compared to 
previous research from Canada, Germany, and the United States, but also in view of the other 
contributions to this special issue: 
Taking local processes and factors into account: Our analysis shows that very specific local or 
regional factors and processes and, relatedly local acceptance affect the deployment of RET 
infrastructure. We emphasize the role of local entrepreneurs who promote such projects but 
also act as mediators in cases of conflict. It is reasonable to expect that these conclusions are 
applicable to other federal systems, where multi-level structures provide incentives and 
opportunities for such local dynamics to unfold. However, the mechanisms behind these 
dynamics and, thus, the interaction between policies at the different state levels may vary. In 
19 
 
Switzerland, it is the national level that has set very ambitious energy-related goals. Subnational 
and local governments must basically comply with these national targets. This relationship 
differs quite markedly from the one in countries like Canada or the United States, where “the 
absence of federal regulations on GHG emissions has left a policy vacuum for sub-federal 
governments to fill” (Lachapelle, Borick, and Rabe 2012, 345) and where, therefore, the 
transition of the energy system is driven by forerunner subnational entities (see Mazmanian et 
al. in this special issue). In such a context, local entrepreneurs and local acceptance may be 
even more important for the successful implementation of RET (see e.g., Walker and Baxter 
2017b, 2017a). 
The chances of decentralization: Decentralized federal structures – thought to present an 
additional veto point in the political systems (Tsebelis 2002) – have been considered a hurdle 
for the transition of energy systems in general and RET implementation in particular (Valentine 
2010). Valentine (2010, 1921) hypothesizes that in Canada, more central structures would 
facilitate the implementation of coercive instruments to both promote renewable energy and 
better coordinate among, for example, provinces with either high hydropower or high wind 
power potentials. Germany might serve as the prime example of a centralized (and federal) 
country that has been a front runner in the deployment of renewable energies (Weidner and 
Mez 2008). The federal level also concentrates authority for all regulatory issues related to 
power lines in order to increase efficiency and to reduce bureaucracy (Steinbach 2013, 227). 
However, the construction of energy-related infrastructure (i.e., wind farms, grid extensions) 
has increasingly simultaneously provoked local opposition in the country (Quitzow et al. 2016, 
166f.; Reusswig et al. 2016). Moreover, empirical evidence from other more centralized 
contexts (both unitary and federal) documents a more sceptic view of the effect of centralized 
structures on the promotion of renewables. Wolsink (1996) argues that “central planning 
problems” were important reasons why wind power was not successfully implemented in the 
Netherlands (see also Wolsink 2007 for a more recent corroboration of this claim). In the 
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Australian federal system, the lack of coordination between the federal and the state 
governments served as a barrier to the development of renewable energies (Jones 2009). 
Together with these findings, the Swiss results suggest two conclusions. First, decentralized 
political structures do not necessarily hinder the deployment of RET. Naturally, if the national 
level is the “pusher” (Weidner and Mez 2008, 371) of renewable energy, the centralization of 
powers speeds up their development, but the opposite can happen if the national government 
serves as a “barrier” to change, like in the United States under Donald Trump or Canada under 
Stephan Harper. In the latter cases, decentralized structures where subnational units can “push” 
for change may be advantageous. These forerunners may trigger diffusion and learning effects 
(Berry and Berry 2014; Braun and Gilardi 2006), and thus encourage other subnational units to 
follow their lead in a bottom-up fashion. The comparison of Germany and Switzerland – both 
countries with ambitious national targets – also reveals that centralized powers do not prevent 
local protest from emerging. Indeed, subnational autonomy and practices of multi-level 
governance, like in the Swiss case, help create locally adapted solutions that may facilitate 
successful RET implementation.  
   
Conclusion 
This article has explored the factors that obstruct and promote the deployment of renewable 
energy generating infrastructure in the Swiss federal units. Using the example of small-scale 
hydropower, we shed light on how political regulations at the cantonal level and the interaction 
between national policies and local political processes affect the deployment of renewable 
energy production. Relying on a mixed-method approach, we arrive at the following main 
findings. 
First, while the deployment of small-scale hydropower is strongly associated with the respective 
areas’ natural potential for the generation of this energy, the Swiss cantons vary in the extent to 
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which they tap into their potential. This is a first indication that the Swiss subnational units use 
their leeway in implementing the nationally-set energy targets and they do so in varying ways. 
The statistical analysis suggests that this observed variety is explained by natural, economic, 
and political conditions. The number of distribution grid operators is positively correlated with 
the deployment of small-scale hydropower. This finding lends support to our hypothesis that 
where several such operators exist within a canton, the likelihood of at least one of them offering 
good feed-in conditions for planned projects or even initiating local projects increases. This 
result fits in well with a more general discussion about the challenge of feeding decentrally 
produced renewable-source electricity into the grid (e.g., Battaglini et al. 2009; Hammons 2008; 
Osmani et al. 2013). Our study indicates that grid integration not only concerns the system 
level, but may also influence actors’ decisions and behavior with regards to electricity 
production at the project level.  
Moreover, our analysis implies that policies both at the national and the subnational level play 
a role in the deployment of small-scale hydropower. This said, while national policies obviously 
cannot account for the variation in deployment levels across the cantons, the case study of 
Valais demonstrates that the national feed-in tariff system affects projects’ economic 
conditions. National subsidies can have two effects. On the one hand, they can help find a 
compromise with local-level opposition by providing compensation payments. On the other 
hand, the resources may also enable initiators to optimize the quality of a project. At the 
subnational level, the varying degrees to which cantons promote and regulate (small-scale) 
hydropower are related to the cantonal deployment of small-scale hydropower. However, 
although we expected that having an encompassing policy mix in place to promote hydropower 
would be correlated with a more sizable deployment of small-scale hydropower, our 
quantitative analyses produced the opposite results. The Valais and Berne case studies show 
that the regulation logic in place is more important than the question of how encompassing the 
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cantonal policy mix is. In particular, regulation following a “protection logic,” which involves 
positive planning and centralized structures, can trigger a restrictive effect on the deployment 
of small-scale hydropower by excluding viable alternatives and reducing the ability to react to 
local demands in a flexible way.  
Furthermore, our analysis corroborates previous research emphasizing the crucial role that 
social acceptance plays in RET implementation (e.g., Batel, Devine-Wright, and Tangeland 
2013; Stadelmann-Steffen et al. 2018; Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer 2007). Whereas the 
statistical analysis focused on the socio-political acceptance of small-scale hydropower and, 
thus, on the technology level, the case studies revealed that “community acceptance” 
(Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer 2007) is crucial for successful implementation at the project 
level. As discussed above, advantageous technical and political conditions can help reduce or 
even dissolve local opposition. Open regulation and subsidies in particular increase actors’ 
room for maneuver and, thus, the likelihood of finding an acceptable solution. However, at the 
end of the day, the local actors determine a projects’ success or failure. The role of local 
entrepreneurs who act as project promoters and process mediators cannot be underestimated. 
Naturally, our study is not without limitations. It focuses on one specific renewable energy 
source in a single country. For example, one might assume that the important role of planning 
policies identified in this study is peculiar to hydropower, which is particularly strongly 
restricted by the existence of waterways and topography, whereas it might be less important 
for, e.g., solar or wind power where siting alternatives might be more numerous. Future research 
should broaden the perspective and investigate on whether the factors identified in this study 
can be generalized to different energy sources and contexts. Still, we want to argue that the 
implications of our study are relevant beyond the Swiss case and beyond the case of small-scale 
hydropower. In particular, if decentralized energy sources are to be promoted, local actors 
(entrepreneurs) should be motivated and supported so that they consider initiating projects. 
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Federal and subnational governments can provide advantageous conditions by defining general 
targets, providing incentives, and relying on open, non-restrictive regulation. This conclusion 
seems to be relevant regardless of state structures. In other words, subnational and local leeway 
in the definition and organization of projects can go a long way in successfully preventing or 
dealing with local opposition in countries with a centralized energy sector authority as well.  
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Notes 
1 Some leeway exists with respect to connection costs, which are not fully determined in the feed-in 
tariff. 
2 Further case studies conducted within the framework of the project (in the cantons of Argovia and 
Grisons) support the conclusion that regulation open with respect to the siting of small-hydropower 
plants or the absence of regulation facilitates the deployment of this energy source (Stadelmann-Steffen 
et al. 2018). Unfortunately, the cantonal policy data used in the quantitative analyses do not allow for a 
distinction between different regulation logics. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variables used in the statistical analysis 
Variable Descriptive statistics Operationalization / Source 
Number of small-scale 
hydropower plants 
Mean: 17.96 
SD: 21.92 
Min: 0 
Max: 85 
Number of small-scale hydropower plants, 2017 
(Bundesamt für Energie BFE 2017) 
Total installed capacity 
in MW 
Mean: 36.24 
SD: 48.05 
Min: 0 
Max: 190.73 
Total installed capacity in MW, 2017 (Bundesamt für 
Energie BFE 2017). In the regression analysis, we use 
values in GW. 
Natural potential Mean: 0.43 
SD: 0.77 
Min: 0.00 
Max: 2.95 
Theoretical potential of small-scale hydropower in a 
canton, in MW (Schröder, Hemund, and Weingartner 
2012). These are the data on which the figure on page 45 
is based. They are provided by the Federal Office of 
Energy. In the regression analysis, we have used values in 
GW. For the half-cantons, data contained the potential for 
Basel-Country and Basle-Town as well as for the two 
Appenzell together. We used the potential in GWh/a as 
indicated in Appendix 3 of the aforementioned study to 
calculate the amount for each half-canton.  
Distribution grid 
operators 
Mean: 0.28 
SD: 0.35 
Min: 0.01 
Max: 1.11 
Number of distribution grid operators (Elektrizitätswerke) 
in each canton (in 100), 2014 (ElCom 2014). 
Hydropower industry Mean: 2.08 
SD: 2.35 
Min: 0 
Max: 9 
Number of companies supplying water turbines and small-
scale hydropower plants in each canton (Swiss Small 
Hydro 2014). 
Cantonal policy mix 1 = 53.85% 
0 = 46.15% 
Index based on the existence of a hydropower strategy and 
the instrument mix for the promotion of hydropower. 1 = 
encompassing strategy or instrument mix; 0 = no strategy? 
or only soft instruments. The data describes the cantonal 
situation in 2014 (Kammermann 2018). 
Administrative resources Mean: -0.00 
SD: 0.64 
Min: -0.81 
Max: 1.63 
Mean of the standardized values of the following 
indicators: Number of fulltime equivalents, personnel 
costs, material expenditures and subsidies (per capita, 
2002-2014) (Schweizerische Energiedirektorenkonferenz 
(EnDK) 2015). 
Socio-political 
acceptance 
Mean: 0.62 
SD: 0.06 
Min: 0.50 
Max: 0.73 
Share of respondents in % per canton, who agree that 
small-scale hydropower should be strengthened in the 
future energy-mix in Switzerland. Data from 2014 
(Stadelmann-Steffen and Dermont 2016). 
Cantonal financial 
resources 
Mean: 88.92 
SD: 46.33 
Min: 30.00 
Max: 224.00 
Index based on the decree of the Federal Council regarding 
the financial capacity of the cantons for  the years 2006 and 
2007 used for the definition of the financial compensation 
scheme (Federal Council 2005). 
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Strength of left-green 
parties 
Mean: 0.26 
SD: 0.12 
Min: 0.07 
Max: 0.51 
Share of green-left parties (SPS, GPS, GPS, GLP und 
small left-wing parties) in the cantonal parliament, 2002-
2014 (Federal Statistical Office 2016). Missing value for 
the canton Appenzell Outer-Rhodes, where not all 
members of parliament can be assigned to a party. 
 
Note: Based on the full sample (26 cantons). 
  
 
Figure A1: Bayesian regression model of cantonal deployment of small-scale hydropower – 
including the cantons with very low hydro-electrical potential 
 
Notes: Bayesian linear regression (mean and the 95% credible interval), Bayesian estimation using the 
package MCMCglmm in R (Hadfield 2010). N = 25 (Appenzell Inner Rhodes could not be included, 
since no information on the share of left-green parties is available for this canton). 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Interviewees 
Case study: Walibach in Valais Case study: Milibach in Bern 
- Grafschaft commune’s president 
(Initiator of the project) 
- Representative of the local electricity 
company EnBag (Initiator of the 
project 
- Representative of WWF Haut-Valais 
(Opponent of the project) 
- Representative of the local electricity 
company BKW (the project was co-
initiated by the EKW electricity 
company, which today is part of the 
BKW) 
- Representative of the local association 
founded to oppose the project 
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Figure 1: Deployment of small-scale hydropower in the Swiss cantons, 2017 
 
 
Source: Bundesamt für Energie BFE (2017), own illustration. Usage rate = the installed capacity in 
relation to the theoretical hydro-electrical potential (Schröder, Hemund, and Weingartner 2012). The 
canton of Schaffhausen is excluded from the bottom graph, since its installed capacity exceeds the 
estimated theoretical potential, which excludes the lower course of the Rhine and the Rhone. 
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Figure 2: Bayesian regression model of cantonal deployment of small-scale hydropower 
 
Notes: Bayesian linear regression (mean and the 95% credible interval), Bayesian estimation using the 
package MCMCglmm in R (Hadfield 2010). N = 22 (Four cantons with a hydro-electrical theoretical 
potential below 20 MW are excluded: Appenzell Inner and Outer Rhodes, Schaffhausen, and Basel 
Town). 
 
 
